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ABSTRACT
Correct and efficient implementation of general real-time ap-
plications remains by far an open problem. A key issue is
meeting timing constraints whose satisfaction depends on
features of the execution platform, in particular its speed.
Existing rigorous implementation techniques are applicable
to specific classes of systems e.g. with periodic tasks, time
deterministic systems.
We present a general model-based implementation
method for real-time systems based on the use of two mod-
els.
• An abstract model representing the behavior of real-time
software as a timed automaton. The latter describes
user-defined platform-independent timing constraints. Its
transitions are timeless and correspond to the execution
of statements of the real-time software.
• A physical model representing the behavior of the real-
time software running on a given platform. It is obtained
by assigning execution times to the transitions of the ab-
stract model.
A necessary condition for implementability is time-safety,
that is, any (timed) execution sequence of the physical model
is also an execution sequence of the abstract model. Time-
safety simply means that the platform is fast enough to meet
the timing requirements. As execution times of actions are
not known exactly, time-safety is checked for worst-case ex-
ecution times of actions by making an assumption of time-
robustness: time-safety is preserved when speed of the exe-
cution platform increases.
We show that as a rule, physical models are not time-
robust and show that time-determinism is a sufficient con-
dition for time-robustness.
For given real-time software and execution platform cor-
responding to a time-robust model, we define an Execution
Engine that coordinates the execution of the application
software so as to meet its timing constraints. Furthermore,
in case of non-robustness, the Execution Engine can detect
violations of time-safety and stop execution.
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We have implemented the Execution Engine for BIP pro-
grams with real-time constraints. We have validated the im-
plementation method for an adaptive MPEG video encoder.
Experimental results reveal the existence of timing anoma-
lies seriously degrading performance for increasing platform
execution speed.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
D.0 [Software]: General
General Terms
Algorithms, Design, Reliability, Verification
1. INTRODUCTION
Correct and efficient implementation of general real-time
applications remains by far an open problem. A key issue
for design methodologies is meeting timing constraints e.g.
a system reacts within user-defined bounds such as dead-
lines and periodicity. The satisfaction of timing constraints
depends on features of the execution platform, in particular
its speed.
Rigorous design methodologies are model-based, that is,
they explicitly or implicitly associate with a real-time appli-
cation software an abstract model—a platform independent
abstraction of the real-time system—expressing timing con-
straints to be met by the implementation. The model is
based on an abstract notion of time in particular it assumes
that actions are atomic and have zero execution times. Im-
plementation theory allows deciding if a given application
software, i.e. its associated model, can be implemented on
a given platform, that is, for particular execution times of
actions. Usually, implementability is checked for worst-case
execution times by making the assumption that timing con-
straints will also be met for smaller execution times. This
robustness assumption that increasing the speed of the exe-
cution platform preserves satisfaction of timing constraints
does not always hold as explained in this paper.
Existing rigorous implementation techniques use specific
programming models. Synchronous programs can be con-
sidered as a network of strongly synchronized components.
Their execution is a sequence of non-interruptible steps that
define a logical notion of time. In a step each component
performs a quantum of computation. An implementation is
correct if the worst-case execution times (WCET) for steps
are less than the requested response time for the system.
For asynchronous real-time programs e.g. ADA programs,
there is no notion of execution step. Components are driven
by events. Fixed priority scheduling policies are used for
sharing resources between components. Scheduling theory
allows to estimate system response times for components
with known period and time budget.
Recent implementation techniques consider more general
programming models [12, 13, 5]. The proposed approaches
rely on a notion of logical execution time (LET) which corre-
sponds to the difference between the release time and the due
time of an action, defined in the program using an abstract
notion of time. To cope with uncertainty of the underlying
platform, a program behaves as if its actions consume ex-
actly their LET: even if they start after their release time
and complete before their due time, their effect is visible
exactly at these times. This is achieved by reading for each
action its input exactly at its release time and its output
exactly at its due time. Time-safety is violated if an action
takes more than its LET to execute.
For a given application and a target platform, the paper
extends this principle as follows.
• We consider that the application software is represented
by an abstract model based on timed automata [4]. The
model takes into account only platform-independent tim-
ing constraints expressing user-dependent requirements.
The actions of the model represent statements of the ap-
plication software and are assumed to be timeless. Using
timed automata allows more general timing constraints
than LET (e.g. lower bounds, upper bounds, time non-
determinism). The abstract model describes the dynamic
behavior of the application software as a set of interact-
ing tasks without restriction on their type (i.e. periodic,
sporadic, etc.).
• We introduce a notion of physical model. This model de-
scribes the behavior of the abstract model (and thus of the
application software) when it is executed on a target plat-
form. It is obtained from the abstract model by assigning
to its actions execution times which are upper bounds of
the actual execution times for the target platform.
• We provide a rigorous implementation method which from
a given physical model (abstract model and given WCET
for the target platform) leads under some robustness as-
sumption, to a correct implementation. The method is
implemented by a Real-Time Execution Engine which re-
spects the semantics of the abstract model (see Figure 1).
Furthermore, if robustness of models cannot be guaran-
teed, it checks online if the execution is correct, that is,
if timing constraints of the model are met. In addition,
it checks violation of essential properties of the abstract
model such as deadlock-freedom, consistency of the timing
constraints, etc.
More formally, a physical model Mϕ is an abstract model
M equipped with a function ϕ assigning execution times
to its actions. It represents the behavior of the application
software running on a platform. The physical model Mϕ is
time-safe if all its timed traces are also timed traces of the
abstract model. We show that a time-safe physical model
may not be time-robust: reducing execution times does not
preserve time-safety. A physical model Mϕ is called time-
robust if any physical model Mϕ′ is time-safe for all ϕ
′ such
that ϕ′ ≤ ϕ. We show that non-deterministic models are
not time-robust in general.
The rest of the paper deals with safe and correct imple-
mentation of an application software on an execution plat-
form if the WCET for its actions define a time-robust phys-
ical model. The application software consists of a set of
components modeled as timed automata and interacting by
rendezvous. An interaction is a set of actions belonging to
distinct components that must be synchronized. It can be
executed from a given state only if all the involved actions
are enabled. We define a Real-Time Execution Engine which
ensures components coordination by executing interactions.
The Real-Time Execution Engine proceeds by steps. Each
step is the sequential composition of three functions:
• Computing time intervals in which each interaction is en-
abled, by applying semantics of the abstract model. Time
intervals are specified by using a global abstract time vari-
able t.
• Updating the abstract time t by the real time tr provided
by the execution platform, if tr does not exceed the ear-
liest deadline of the enabled interactions. Otherwise, a
time-safety violation is detected and execution stops.
• Scheduling amongst the possible interactions by executing
one amongst the most urgent.
Platform Model
(e.g. WCET)
Static Analysis
Model (Timed Automata)
Application Software
Compiler
Platform
time-robustness?
deadlock?
time-safety
violation?
Application
Real-Time Engine
Figure 1: Toolset overview.
We show that our implementation method is correct for
time-robust execution time assignments. That is, for time-
robust execution time assignments ϕ, the set of the timed
traces computed by the Real-Time Execution Engine is con-
tained in the set of the timed traces of M if the execution
times of the actions are less than or equal to the execution
times defined by ϕ. If time-safety cannot be guaranteed for
some ϕ, then the Real-Time Execution Engine will stop,
that is, a deadline is violated by the physical system.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 proposes a
notion of implementation and associated properties of time
safety and time-robustness.It also presents results about sat-
isfaction of these properties by classes of systems. Section 3
provides the implementation method. Experimental results
illustrating the application of the method are given in Sec-
tion 4. Section 5 provides concluding remarks as well as
discussion about future work.
2. A NOTION OF IMPLEMENTATION
AND ROBUSTNESS
2.1 Preliminary Definitions
In order to measure time progress, we use clocks that are
variables increasing synchronously. They can be valued ei-
ther as integer or as real. We denote by T the set of clock
values. T can be the set of non-negative integers N or the
set of non-negative reals R+.
Given a set of clocks X, a valuation of the clocks v : X→ T
is a function associating with each clock x its value v(x).
Given a subset of clocks X′ ⊆ X and a clock value l ∈ T, we
denote by v[X′ 7→ l] the valuation defined by:
v[X′ 7→ l](x) =

l if x ∈ X′
v(x) otherwise.
Following [8], given a set of clocks X, guards are finite
conjunctions of typed intervals. Guards are used to specify
when actions of a system are enabled. They are expres-
sions of the form [l ≤ x ≤ u]τ where x is a clock, l ∈ T,
u ∈ T∪{+∞} and τ is an urgency type, that is, τ ∈ { l, d, e },
where l is used for lazy actions (i.e. non-urgent), d is used
for delayable actions (i.e. urgent just before they become
disabled), and e is used for eager actions (i.e. urgent when-
ever they are enabled). We write [x = l]τ for [l ≤ x ≤ l]τ .
We consider the following simplification rule [8]:
[l1 ≤ x1 ≤ u1]τ1 ∧ [l2 ≤ x2 ≤ u2]τ2
≡ [(l1 ≤ x1 ≤ u1) ∧ (l2 ≤ x2 ≤ u2)]max τ1,τ2 ,
considering that urgency types are ordered as follows: l <
d < e. By application of this rule, any guard g can be
put into the following form: g =
h n^
i=1
li ≤ xi ≤ ui
iτ
. The
predicate of g on clocks is the expression
n^
i=1
li ≤ v(xi) ≤
ui. The predicate urg[g] that characterizes the valuations of
clocks for which g is urgent is also defined by:
urg
ˆ
g
˜ ⇐⇒
8<: false if g is lazy (i.e. τ = l)g ∧ ¬(g>) if g is delayable (i.e. τ = d)g if g is eager (i.e. τ = e),
where g> is a notation for the predicate defined by
g>(v) ⇐⇒ ∃ε > 0 . ∀δ ∈ [0, ε] . g(v + δ). We denote by
G(X) the set of guards over a set of clocks X.
2.2 Abstract Model
Definition 1 (abstract model). An abstract model
is a timed automaton M = (A,Q,X,−→) such that:
• A is a finite set of actions,
• Q is a finite set of control locations,
• X is a finite set of clocks,
• and −→⊆ Q× (A×G(X)×2X)×Q is a finite set of labeled
transitions. A transition is a tuple (q, a, g, r, q′) where a is
an action executed by the transition, g is a guard over X
and r is a subset of clocks that are reset by the transition.
We write q
a,g,r−→ q′ for (q, a, g, r, q′) ∈−→.
An abstract model describes the abstract behavior of the
system. Timing constraints, that is, guards of transitions,
take into account only requirements (e.g. deadlines, peri-
odicity, etc.). The semantics assume timeless execution of
actions.
Definition 2 (abstract model semantics). An ab-
stract model M = (A,Q,X,−→) defines a transition system
TS. States of TS are of the form (q, v), where q is a control
location of M and v is a valuation of the clocks X.
• Actions. We have (q, v) a−→ (q′, v[r 7→ 0]) if q a,g,r−→ q′ in
the abstract model and g(v) is true.
• Time steps. For a waiting time δ ∈ T, δ > 0, we have
(q, v)
δ−→ (q, v + δ) if for all transitions q a,g,r−→ q′ of M
and for all δ′ ∈ [0, δ[, ¬urg[g](v + δ′).
Given an abstract model M = (A,Q,X,−→), a finite
(resp. an infinite) execution sequence of M from an ini-
tial state (q0, v0) is a sequence of actions and time-steps
(qi, vi)
σi−→ (qi+1, vi+1) of M , σi ∈ A ∪ T and i ∈
{ 0, 1, 2, . . . , n } (resp. i ∈ N).
In contrast to other models of timed automata [3], for
abstract models it is always possible to execute a transi-
tion from a state [8]. If no action is possible only time can
progress. We call this situation a deadlock. Henceforth, we
consider abstract models M = (A,Q,X,−→) such that any
circuit in the graph −→ has at least a clock that is reset and
tested against a positive lower bound, that is, M is struc-
turally non-zeno [7]. This class of abstract models does not
have time-locks, that is, time always eventually progresses.
q0
q1
q2
a
[0 ≤ x ≤ +∞]e
∅
[50 ≤ x ≤ 60]d
b
∅ ∅
[0 ≤ x ≤ 50]l
c
i
[100 ≤ x ≤ 120]d
{x}
Figure 2: Example of abstract model.
Example 1. Consider an abstract model M =
(A, {q0, q1, q2}, {x},−→) with a set of actions A = {a, b, c, i},
a single clock x and the following set of transitions (see Fig-
ure 2): −→ = ˘ (q0, a, [0 ≤ x ≤ +∞]e, ∅, q1),
(q1, b, [51 ≤ x ≤ 60]d, ∅, q2),
(q1, c, [0 ≤ x ≤ 50]l, ∅, q2),
(q2, i, [100 ≤ x ≤ 120]d, {x}, q0)
¯
.
Consider execution sequences of M from the initial state
(q0, 0). It can be easily shown [1] that M admits execution
sequences that are infinite repetition of sequences of two fol-
lowing forms:
1. (q0, 0)
a−→ (q1, 0) δ1−→ (q1, δ1) b−→ (q2, δ1) δ2−→ (q2, δ1 +
δ2)
i−→ (q0, 0) where 50 ≤ δ1 ≤ 60 and 100 − δ1 ≤ δ2 ≤
120− δ1, and
2. (q0, 0)
a−→ (q1, 0) δ1−→ (q1, δ1) c−→ (q2, δ1) δ2−→ (q2, δ1 +
δ2)
i−→ (q0, 0) where 0 ≤ δ1 ≤ 50 and 100 − δ1 ≤ δ2 ≤
120− δ1.
2.3 Physical Model
A key issue for a correct implementation from an ab-
stract model is the correspondence between abstract time
and physical time. There are different manners for estab-
lishing such a correspondence as discussed as follows.
Consider an action a that resets a clock x at the global
abstract time t, and assume that the reset of x takes ε > 0
abstract
time
g
t
t+ ε
t t+ ε
a
{x}
physical
time
abstract
time
g
t t+ ε
t
t+ ε
a
ε
{x}
physical
time
Figure 3: Execution based on continuous mapping
of the physical time (left) vs frozen clocks (right).
time units in the physical model, meaning that the reset of
x starts at t and completes at t+ ε. A naive approach is to
continuously map the physical time on the value of the clock
x. Since x is reset at the actual time t + ε (see Figure 3),
using this approach leads to a drift of ε between the abstract
model and the physical model. There exist approaches for
analyzing how clock drifts may disable properties of an ab-
stract model [2, 11, 17].
An alternative approach is to ensure a correct tracking
of physical time and completely avoid this kind of drift be-
tween abstract time and physical time. To achieve that, the
proposed semantics for physical models considers that the
value of the clocks are frozen during the execution of an ac-
tion, and the clocks are updated after that in order to take
into account action execution times. That is, the clock x is
considered to be reset at the model time t even if x is reset
at the actual time t+ε. Then abstract time is updated with
respect to actual time at t+ε, that is, the current value of x
at the actual time t+ε is ε which complies with the abstract
model (see Figure 3).
2.3.1 Definition of Physical Models
Physical models are abstract models modified so as to take
into account non-null execution times. They represent the
behavior of the application software running on a platform.
We consider that a physical model is time-safe if its execu-
tion sequences are execution sequences of the correspond-
ing abstract model, that is, execution times are compatible
with timing constraints. Furthermore, a physical model is
time-robust if reducing the execution times preserves this
time-safety property.
q
q′
r
g
a
ϕ(a)−→
q
q′
∅
waita
r ∪ {xa}
a
g
enda
[xa = ϕ(a)]
d
Transition in M . Corresponding transitions in Mϕ.
Figure 4: From abstract model to physical model.
Since actions are timeless in abstract models, a timing
constraint for an action applies to both the time instant cor-
responding to its beginning and the time instant correspond-
ing to its completion. In physical models, these instants may
not coincide. We consider that timing constraints in physi-
cal models apply to start times of the actions. As explained
above, we also consider that clocks are frozen during an ac-
tion execution. This mechanism ensures that clock resets as-
sociated to each action behave exactly as if they were done at
action start time. This allows considering timing constraints
that are equalities for non-instantaneous actions. Such con-
straints are useful for modeling exact synchronization with
time, e.g. for describing a periodic execution.
Definition 3 (physical model). Let M =
(A,Q,X,−→) be an abstract model and ϕ : A → T be
an execution time function that gives for each action a its
execution time ϕ(a).
The physical model Mϕ = (A,Q,X,−→, ϕ) corresponds
to the abstract model M modified so that each transition
(q, a, g, r, q′) of M is decomposed into two consecutive tran-
sitions (see Figure 4):
1. The first transition (q, a, g, r ∪ {xa}, waita) corresponds
to the beginning of the execution of the action a. It is
triggered by guard g and it resets the set of clocks r, exactly
as (q, a, g, r, q′) in M . It also resets an additional clock xa
used for measuring the execution time of a.
2. The second transition (waita, enda, gϕ(a), ∅, q′) corre-
sponds to the completion of a. It is constrained by gϕ(a) ≡
[xa = ϕ(a)]
d that enforces waiting time ϕ(a) at control
location waita, which is the time elapsed during the exe-
cution of the action a.
Notice that if (q, v) is a state of the abstract model then
(q, v, v′) is a state of the physical model such that v′ is a
valuation of clocks { xa | a ∈ A }. We compare the behavior
of Mϕ from initial states of the form (q0, v0, 0) with the be-
havior of M from corresponding initial states (q0, v0). In the
above definition, an abstract model M and its correspond-
ing physical model Mϕ coincide if actions are timeless, that
is, if ϕ = 0. In a physical model Mϕ, every execution of an
action a is followed by a wait for ϕ(a) time units which can
be abbreviated as (q, v)
a,ϕ(a)−→ (q′, v[r 7→ 0] + ϕ(a)). This is
equivalent to the following execution of the corresponding
abstract model M :
(q, v)
a−→ (q′, v[r 7→ 0]) ϕ(a)−→ (q′, v[r 7→ 0] + ϕ(a)),
Notice that a time step (q′, v[r 7→ 0]) ϕ(a)−→ (q′, v[r 7→ 0] +
ϕ(a)) of Mϕ may not be a time step of M if there exists a
transition q′
a′,g′,r′−→ q′′ such that urg[g′](v[r 7→ 0]+δ) and δ ∈
[0, ϕ(a)[, meaning that the physical model violates timing
constraints defined in the corresponding abstract model.
We consider only execution sequences of physical models
Mϕ such that the waiting times for the actions are minimal,
that is, (q, v)
δ−→ (q, v+δ) a,ϕ(a)−→ (q′, (v+δ)[r 7→ 0]+ϕ(a)) is
an execution sequence of Mϕ if δ = min { δ′ ≥ 0 | g(v+δ′)}
where g is the guard of the action a at control location q
(see Figure 5).
Definition 4 (time-safety and time-robustness).
A physical model Mϕ = (A,Q,X,−→, ϕ) is time-safe if for
time
waiting
0
a2
a3a1
guard of a2 guard of a3guard of a1
Figure 5: Minimal waiting time for action execution.
any initial state (q0, v0) the set of the execution sequences
of Mϕ is contained in the set of the execution sequences of
M . A physical model Mϕ is time-robust if Mϕ′ is time-safe
for all execution time functions ϕ′ ≤ ϕ. An abstract
model is time-robust if all its time-safe physical models are
time-robust.
Most of the techniques for analyzing the schedulability
of real-time systems are based on worst-case estimates of
execution times. They rely on the fact that the global worst-
case behavior of the system is achieved by assuming local
worst-case behavior. Unfortunately, this assumption is not
valid for systems that are prone to timing anomalies, that is,
a faster local execution may lead to a slower global execution
[15]. A time-robust abstract model is a system without such
timing anomalies, that is, if it is time-safe for execution time
function ϕ, then it is time-safe for execution time functions
less than or equal to ϕ.
Example 2. We consider the abstract model M given in
Example 1 and a family of execution time functions ϕ such
that ϕ(a) = ϕ(b) = K, ϕ(c) = 2K and ϕ(i) = 0. The be-
havior of the corresponding physical models Mϕ from initial
state (q0, 0) is summarized in Figure 6 (see [1] for details).
α ϕ(α)
a K
b K
c 2K
i 0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
K
Mϕ is time-safe (only)
Mϕ is time-safe (and time-robust)
Figure 6: Time-safe physical models Mϕ.
Definition 5 (time-determinism). An abstract
model is time-deterministic if all its guards are eager (or
delayable) equalities.
Time-deterministic abstract models are such that if two
execution sequences have the same corresponding sequences
of actions, then they are identical. That is, time instants
for the execution of the actions are the same. Time-
deterministic abstract models are time-robust, as shown be-
low.
Proposition 1. Time-deterministic abstract models are
time-robust.
Proof. See [1].
Time-deterministic abstract models are a subclass of
timed automata in which each action has a logical execution
time (LET), that is, a fixed time budget for its execution. In
such systems, the execution of actions is followed by a syn-
chronization with time, which ensures time-determinism: if
two execution sequences execute the same sequence of ac-
tions, they also execute actions at the same time instants.
Example 3. Consider the time-deterministic abstract
model M given in Figure 7 obtained from the abstract model
of Example 1. Execution sequences of M are infinite rep-
etitions of sequences of the following form: (q0, 0)
a−→
(q1, 0)
50−→ (q1, 50) c−→ (q2, 50) 70−→ (q2, 120) i−→ (q0, 0).
The physical models Mϕ corresponding to M are time-safe
if and only if ϕ(a) ≤ 50, ϕ(c) ≤ 70 and ϕ(i) = 0. Notice
that for 51 ≤ ϕ(a) ≤ 60, ϕ(b) ≤ 60 and ϕ(i) = 0, Mϕ
remains deadlock-free but it is not time-safe.
q0
q1
q2
a
[x = 0]d
∅
[x = 60]d
b
∅ ∅
[x = 50]d
c
i
[x = 120]d
{x}
Figure 7: Time-deterministic abstract model M .
Definition 6 (action-determinism). An abstract
model is action-deterministic if there is at most one
transition issued from each control location.
If a time-deterministic abstract model is also action-
deterministic, it has a single execution sequence from a given
initial state (q0, v0), that is, it is totally deterministic. Such
models have been considered by [12, 13, 5]. Their time-
robustness allows checking time-safety only for worst-case
execution times. In addition, for these systems time-safety
verification boils down to deadlock-freedom verification, as
explained below.
Proposition 2. If M is an abstract model which is
action-deterministic, deadlock-free and contains only de-
layable guards, then the physical models Mϕ are time-safe
if and only if they are deadlock-free.
Proof. See [1].
Example 4. We modify the time-deterministic abstract
model given in Example 3 in order to make it also action-
deterministic (see Figure 8). Its execution sequences remain
the same, that is, infinite repetitions of sequences of the fol-
lowing form: (q0, 0)
a−→ (q1, 0) 50−→ (q1, 50) c−→ (q2, 50) 70−→
(q2, 120)
i−→ (q0, 0). The corresponding physical model Mϕ
is time-safe if and only if ϕ(a) ≤ 50, ϕ(c) ≤ 70 and ϕ(i) = 0,
and deadlocks otherwise.
3. IMPLEMENTATION METHOD
We use the concepts and definitions of the previous sec-
tion to define an implementation method for a given physi-
cal model. If the model is robust then the implementation
is time-safe. Otherwise, the method detects violations of
time-safety and stops execution. We consider that the ap-
plication software is a set of interacting components. Each
q0
q1
q2
a
[x = 0]d
∅
i
[x = 120]d
{x}
∅
[x = 50]d
c
Figure 8: Deterministic abstract model M .
component is represented by an abstract model. Thus the
abstract model M corresponding to the application is the
parallel composition of the timed automata representing the
components.
Given a physical model Mϕ corresponding to the abstract
model M , the implementation method defines a Real-time
Execution Engine which executes the interactions of the
components by taking into account their timing constraints.
We prove that the method is correct in two steps. We first
define an Execution Engine for the abstract model M and
show that it correctly implements its semantics. Then we
define a Real-time Execution Engine and show that it cor-
rectly implements the semantics of Mϕ.
3.1 Execution Engine for Abstract Models
Definition 7 (composition of abstract models).
Let M i = (Ai,Qi,Xi,−→i), 1 ≤ i ≤ n, be a set of abstract
models with disjoint sets of actions and clocks, that is, for
all i 6= j we have Ai ∩ Aj = ∅ and Xi ∩ Xj = ∅.
A set of interactions γ is a subset of 2A, where A =Sn
i=1 Ai, such that any interaction a ∈ γ contains at most
one action of each component M i, that is, a = { ai | i ∈ I }
where ai ∈ Ai and I ⊆ { 1, 2, . . . , n }. We define the com-
position of the abstract models M i as the abstract model
M = (A,Q,X,−→γ) over the set of actions γ as follows:
• Q = Q1 × Q2 × . . .× Qn
• X = X1 ∪ X2 ∪ . . . ∪ Xn
• For a = { ai | i ∈ I } ∈ γ we have (q1, q2, . . . , qn) a,g,r−→γ
(q′1, q
′
2, . . . , q
′
n) in M if and only if g =
V
i∈I gi, r =S
i∈I ri, qi
ai,gi,ri−→ q′i in M i for all i ∈ I, and q′i = qi
for all i /∈ I.
The composition M = (A,Q,X,−→γ) of abstract models
M i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, corresponds to a general notion of product
for the timed automata M i. We define an Execution Engine
which computes sequences of interactions by applying the
above operational semantics rule (see Figure 9). For given
states (qi, vi) of the components M
i and corresponding lists
of transitions { qi aj ,gj ,rj−→ q′j }j issued from qi, the Execution
Engine computes the set of enabled interactions, chooses one
(enabled) interaction using a real-time scheduling policy and
executes it.
To check enabledness of interactions, the Execution En-
gine expresses the timing constraints involving local clocks
of components in terms of a single clock t measuring the ab-
solute time elapsed, that is, t is never reset. For this, we use
a valuation w : X → T in order to store the absolute time
w(x) of the last reset of each clock x with respect to the
clock t. The valuation v of the clocks X can be computed
from the current value of t and w by using the equality
v = t − w. Thus, the Execution Engine considers states of
the form s = (q, w, t) where q = (q1, q2, . . . , qn) ∈ Q is a
control location of M , w : X → T is valuation for clocks
representing their reset times and t ∈ T is the value of the
current (absolute) time.
We rewrite each atomic expression l ≤ x ≤ u involved in a
guard by using the global clock t and reset times w, that is,
l ≤ x ≤ u ≡ l+w(x) ≤ t ≤ u+w(x). This allows reducing
the conjunction of guards from synchronizing components
into a guard of the form:^
j
ˆ
lj ≤ t ≤ uj
˜τj = h(maxj lj) ≤ t ≤ (minj uj)imax τj .
Thus, the guard g associated to an interaction a at control
location q can be put in the form g = [l ≤ t ≤ u]τ . For a
given state s = (q, w, t) of M , we associate to the interaction
a its next activation time nexts(a) and its next deadline
deadlines(a). Values nexts(a) and deadlines(a) are computed
from g = [l ≤ t ≤ u]τ as follows:
nexts(a) =

max { t, l } if l ≤ u and t ≤ u
+∞ otherwise,
deadlines(a) =
8><>:
u if l ≤ u ∧ t ≤ u ∧ τ = d
l if l ≤ u ∧ t < l ∧ τ = e
t if l ≤ u ∧ t ∈ [l, u] ∧ τ = e
+∞ otherwise.
Notice that we have nexts(a) ≤ deadlines(a).
Given a state s = (q, w, t), q = (q1, . . . , qn), the Engine
computes the next interaction to be executed as follows.
1. It first computes the set of enabled interactions γq ⊆ γ
at control location q, from given sets of transitions issued
from qi for each component M
i. According to Defini-
tion 7, an interaction a = { ai | i ∈ I } ∈ γ is enabled at
control location q if (q1, . . . , qn)
a,g,r−→γ (q′1, . . . , q′n), where
g is the conjunction of the guards gi of actions ai and r is
the union of the resets ri of actions ai, that is, g =
V
i∈I gi,
r =
S
i∈I ri, for all i ∈ I we have qi
ai,gi,ri−→ q′i in M i and
for all i /∈ I we have q′i = qi.
2. It chooses an interaction a = { ai | i ∈ I } ∈ γq en-
abled at state s = (q, w, t), that is, such that there exists
a time instant t′ ≥ t at which the guard g of a holds (i.e.
nexts(a) < +∞), and no timing constraint is violated (i.e.
nexts(a) ≤ D = mina∈γq deadlines(a)). The choice of
a depends on the considered real-time scheduling policy.
For instance, EDF (Earliest Deadline First) scheduling
policy can be used, that is, the chosen interaction a satis-
fies deadlines(a) = D. It executes a with minimal waiting
time, that is, at time instant nexts(a). The execution of
a corresponds to the execution of all actions ai, i ∈ I, fol-
lowed by the computation of a new valuation w and the
update of control locations.
Algorithm 1 gives an implementation of the Execution
Engine for the composition of abstract models. It basically
consists of an infinite loop that first computes enabled in-
teractions at current state s of the composition (line 3). It
stops if no interaction is possible from s (i.e. deadlock) at
scheduling policy
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Component
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Figure 9: Abstract model Execution Engine.
line 5. Otherwise, it chooses an interaction a (line 7) and
executes a with minimal waiting time (lines 9 and 12). Fi-
nally, the state s is updated in order to take into account
the execution of a (lines 13 and 14).
Algorithm 1 Abstract Model Execution Engine
Require: abstract models M i = (Qi,Xi,−→i), 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
initial control location (q10 , . . . , q
n
0 ), interactions γ
1: s = (q1, . . . , qn, w, t) ← (q10 , . . . , qn0 , 0, 0) // init.
2: loop
3: γq = EnabledInteractions(q)
4:
5: if ∃a ∈ γq . nexts(a) < +∞ then
6: D ← mina∈γq deadlines(a) // next deadline
7: a = { ai | i ∈ I } ← RealT imeScheduler(γq, s)
8:
9: t ← nexts(a) // consider minimal waiting time
10:
11: for all i ∈ I do
12: Execute(ai) // execute involved component
13: w ← w[ri 7→ t] // reset clocks
14: qi ← q′i // update control location
15: end for
16: else
17: exit(DEADLOCK)
18: end if
19: end loop
3.2 Real-Time Execution Engine
Definition 8 (composition of physical models).
Consider abstract models M i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and corresponding
physical models M iϕi = (Ai,Qi,Xi,−→i, ϕi), with disjoint
sets of actions and clocks.
Given a set of interactions γ, and an associative and com-
mutative operator ⊕ : T×T→ T, the composition of physical
models M iϕi is the physical model Mϕ corresponding to the
abstract model M which is the composition of M i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
with the execution time function ϕ : γ → T such that
ϕ(a) =
L
i∈I ϕi(ai) for interactions a = { ai | i ∈ I } ∈ γ,
ai ∈ Ai.
The definition is parameterized by an operator ⊕ used to
compute the execution time ϕ(a) of an interaction a from
execution times ϕ(ai) of the actions ai involved in a. The
choice of this operator depends on the considered execu-
tion platform and in particular how components (abstract
models) are parallelized. For instance, for a single processor
platform (i.e. sequential execution of actions), ⊕ is addition.
If all components can be executed in parallel, ⊕ is max.
As a rule, it is usually very difficult to obtain execution
times for the actions (i.e. block of code) of an application
software. Execution times vary a lot from an execution to
another, depending on the contents of the input data, the
dynamic state of the hardware platform (pipeline, caches,
etc.). There exist techniques for computing upper bounds of
the execution time of a bloc of code, that is, estimates of the
worst-case execution times [16]. Given abstract models M i,
and functions ϕi specifying WCET for the actions of M
i,
the abstract composition M can be safely implemented if
the physical composition Mϕ (defined above) is time-robust.
Algorithm 2 Real-Time Execution Engine
Require: abstract models M i = (Qi,Xi,−→i), 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
initial control location (q10 , . . . , q
n
0 ), interactions γ
1: s = (q1, . . . , qn, w, t) ← (q10 , . . . , qn0 , 0, 0) // init.
2: loop
3: γs = EnabledInteractions(q)
4:
5: if ∃a ∈ γq . nexts(a) < +∞ then
6: D ← mina∈γq deadlines(a) // next deadline
7: t ← tr // update Engine clock w.r.t. actual time
8: if t ≤ D then
9: a = { ai | i ∈ I } ← RealT imeScheduler(γq, s)
10:
11: t ← nexts(a) // update Engine clock
12: wait tr ≥ t // real-time wait
13:
14: for all i ∈ I do
15: Execute(ai) // execute involved component
16: w ← w[ri 7→ t] // reset clocks
17: qi ← q′i // update control location
18: end for
19: else
20: exit(DEADLINE_MISS)
21: end if
22: else
23: exit(DEADLOCK)
24: end if
25: end loop
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Figure 10: Real-time Execution Engine.
We defined and implemented a Real-Time Execution En-
gine that does not need an a priori knowledge of execution
time functions ϕi (see figure 10). It ensures the real-time
execution of a component-based application on the target
platform, and stops if the implementation is not time-safe
(a deadline is missed during the execution). Algorithm 2 de-
scribes an implementation of the Real-Time Execution En-
gine for a single processor platform. It differs from Algo-
rithm 1 at lines 7, 8 and 12. It updates the current value of
abstract time t with respect to the current value of physi-
cal time tr (line 7) in order to take into account execution
time of interactions for the considered execution platform.
It stops if time-safety is violated, that is, if t is greater than
the next deadline D (line 8). It also waits for the physi-
cal time to reach the next activation time (nexts(a)) of the
chosen interactions a (line 12).
4. CASE STUDY
We developed a Real-time Execution Engine for the execu-
tion of BIP real-time programs. BIP (Behavior Interaction
Priority) [6] is framework for building real-time systems con-
sisting of heterogeneous components. A component has only
private data. Its interface is given by a set of communication
ports associated with data. The behavior of a component is
given by a timed automaton (the abstract model of a com-
ponent) whose transitions can be labelled by ports and can
execute C++ code (i.e. private data transformations). Con-
nectors between communication ports of components define
the set of enabled interactions (i.e. synchronizations be-
tween components with possible transfer of data). Priority
is a control mechanism for conflict resolution which can be
used to reduce non-determinism and allows direct expression
of scheduling policies.
We studied time-safety and time-robustness for a non-
trivial multimedia application—an adaptive MPEG video
encoder modeled in BIP. We show that the application is
not time-robust. We also explain how its time-robustness
can be enforced using two different methods.
4.1 Description of the Application
We consider an adaptive MPEG video encoder compo-
nentized in BIP [9] and running on a STm8010 board from
STMicroelectronics. It takes a stream of frames of 320×144
pixels as an input, and computes the corresponding encoded
frames (see Figure 11). Since input frames are produced by
a camera at a rate of 10 frames/s (i.e. every 100 ms), en-
coding each frame must be done in D = 100 ms.
OutputFrame
Adaptive-Encoder
Encoder
Controller
Enc(q)
Enc(q)
In Out InOut
GrabFrame EncodeMB
Figure 11: Adaptive video encoder architecture.
The adaptive MPEG video encoder consists of two main
components.
Encoder corresponds to the functional part of the video
encoder, that is, it involves no time constraint. Input
frames are treated by GrabFrame. Each frame is split into
N = 180 macroblocks of 16 × 16 pixels which are indi-
vidually encoded by EncodeMB for given quality levels
qi ∈ Q = { 0, 1, . . . , 8 }. The higher the quality levels are,
the better the video quality is. A bitstream corresponding
to the encoded frames is produced by OutputFrame.
Controller is a controller for Encoder. It chooses quality
levels qi for encoding macroblocks so as not to exceed the
time budget of D = 100 ms for encoding a frame. To keep
low the overhead due to the computation of Controller,
quality levels are only computed every 20 macroblocks,
that is, there are 9 control points in a frame.
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. . .
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ˆ
t ≤ D − (9− i) ∗ C0
˜dg1(i) ≡ ˆt ≤ D − (9− i) ∗ C1˜d
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ˆ
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. . .
Enc(7) > Enc(6)
Enc(2) > Enc(1)
Enc(1) > Enc(0)
Next20MBs
i<9
g0(i)
Figure 12: Controller component.
q 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Cq 4 4.6 5.4 6 8.2 10 12 14.4 16
Table 1: Estimates of execution times (ms).
Components Encoder and Controller interact as follows. At
each control point i ∈ { 0, . . . , 8 } Controller triggers Encoder
for encoding the next 20 macroblocks at a quality level qi.
The computation of qi is based on the time t elapsed since
the beginning of the encoding of the current frame, and esti-
mates of execution times Cq for encoding 20 macroblocks at
quality level q. Execution times have been obtained by pro-
filing techniques using different input streams of frames (see
Table 1). Cq is increasing with quality level q. A quality level
q is enabled at control point i only if t+(9−i)Cq ≤ D, where
(9 − i)Cq is an estimate of the execution time for encoding
the remaining macroblocks of the current frame. This con-
dition is equivalent to the guard gq(i) ≡ t ≤ D − (9− i)Cq.
In order to maximize video quality, we give higher priority
for higher quality levels, that is, for all q ∈ {0, . . . , 7} we
have Enc(q+ 1) > Enc(q) (see Figure 12). The chosen qual-
ity level qi is transmitted by Controller to Encoder through
the port Enc. After encoding the last 20 macroblocks (i.e.
i = 9), Controller waits for the next frame, that is, for t = D.
4.2 Time-Safety
As execution times of the video encoder may vary a lot
from a frame to another [14], we studied time-safety for a
family of execution time functions Kϕ, where the parameter
K ranges in [0.001, 2], and where ϕ denotes an execution
time function corresponding to the actual execution of the
video encoder on the target platform for a particular frame.
Figure 13 shows average quality levels chosen for different
values of the parameter K. They are increasing as K is
decreasing, but time-safety is violated for K = 1.7 and K =
1.4, even if time-safety is guaranteed for K ∈ [0.9, 1.3] (i.e.
lower execution times). That is, the application is not time-
robust. This is due to the fact that the controller is based
on estimates of execution times which can be different from
the actual execution times. This difference depends on the
chosen quality levels, that is, on the value of K. Therefore,
increasing the platform speed (i.e. reducing K) is not a
guarantee for time-safety: time-safety violations still occur
at K = 0.7 and K = 0.8 (see Figure 13).
When time-safety is violated by the video encoder, the
current frame is skipped which is equivalent to encoding all
 0
 1
 2
 3
 4
 5
 6
 7
 8
0.25 0.5 0.75 1.0 1.25 1.5 1.75
av
er
ag
e 
qu
al
ity
 le
ve
l
WCET−based video encoder
time−deterministic video encoder
2
initial video encoder
value for the parameter K
Figure 13: Video encoder execution for execution
time functions Kϕ.
its macroblocks at quality level 0. This leads to a drastic
degradation of the video quality.
4.3 Enforcing Time-Robustness
Time-robustness is a desirable property of an application
since it allows better predictability of its behavior, that is, a
time-robust application is time-safe for any execution times
provided that it is time-safe for worst-case execution times.
We studied two methods for enforcing time-robustness of the
adaptive video encoder.
As explained by Proposition 1 of Section 2.3.1,
time-robustness can be guaranteed by enforcing time-
determinism. This can be achieved by modifying all inequal-
ities involved in guards of Controller into delayable equali-
ties. The time-deterministic video encoder chooses the same
quality levels for all considered values of K, that is, there is
no adaptation of the quality levels with respect to actual ex-
ecution times Kϕ. Time-robustness is obtained by a severe
reduction of the quality of the video (see Figure 13).
Time-robustness can also be achieved by enforcing time-
safety for the component Controller using worst-case execu-
tion times (WCET), as explained in [10]. The principle is to
compute restricted guards for transitions based on a WCET
analysis of the system. As shown in Figure 13, this con-
servative approach guarantees time-robustness by a slight
reduction of the chosen quality levels with respect to the
ones chosen by the initial video encoder.
5. CONCLUSION
We have presented an implementation method for real-
time applications. The method is new and innovates in sev-
eral aspects:
• It does not suffer limitations of existing methods regard-
ing the behavior of the components or the type of timing
constraints. Considered real-time applications include not
only periodic components with deadlines but also compo-
nents with non-deterministic behavior and actions subject
to interval timing constraints.
• It is based on a formally defined relation between ap-
plication software written in high level languages with
atomic and timeless actions and its execution on a given
platform. The relation if formalized by using two mod-
els: 1) abstract models which describe the behavior of
the application software as well as timing constraints on
its actions; 2) physical models which are abstract mod-
els equipped with an execution time function specifying
WCET for the actions of the abstract model running on
a given platform. Time-safety is the property of physical
models guaranteeing that they respect timing constraints.
Time-robust physical models have the property to remain
time-safe for decreasing execution times of their actions.
Non-robustness is a timing anomaly that appears in time
non-deterministic systems.
• It proposes a concrete implementation method using a
Real-time Execution Engine which faithfully implements
physical models. That is, if a physical model defined from
an abstract model and a target platform is time-robust
then the Engine coordinates the execution of the applica-
tion software so as to meet the real-time constraints. The
Real-time Execution Engine is correct-by-construction. It
executes an algorithm which directly implements the op-
erational semantics of the physical model.
The method generalizes existing techniques in particular
those based on LET. These techniques consider fixed LET
for actions, that is, time-deterministic abstract models. In
addition, their models are action-deterministic, that is, only
one action is enabled at a given state. For these models
time-robustness boils down to deadlock-freedom for WCET
as shown in Proposition 2.
To the best of our knowledge, the concept of time-
robustness seems to be new. It can be used to characterize
timing anomalies due to time non-determinism. These tim-
ing anomalies have in principle different causes from timing
anomalies observed for WCET.
Results on time-safety and time-robustness allow a deeper
understanding of causes of anomalies. They advocate for
time-determinism as a means for achieving time-robustness.
An interesting question is loss in performance when in a
model interval constraints are replaced by equalities on their
upper bound. Time-robustness is then achieved through
time-determinization at some performance penalty. We are
currently studying the loss of performance induced by this
transformation.
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